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Rate Limit Reference

Sources: docs/security-kernel-rate-limit-ledger.json.
engine v1.0.234Copy for LLM

This generated snapshot is derived from the security-kernel rate-limit ledger (docs/security-kernel-rate-limit-ledger.json, projected from server/src/modules/security-kernel/rateLimiter.ts). Each row is one rate-limit category applied to HTTP routes by the security kernel; the route reference names the category each operation carries in its Rate limit column.

Ledger schema: security-kernel-rate-limit-ledger.v1. Category count: 14.

Categories

CategoryCanonical categoryOwnerLimitWindow (ms)Requests per minuteAbuse modelReview cadence
anonymous_writeanonymous_writesecurity-kernel206000020unauthenticated write spam, sign-up funnel abuse, and anonymous mutation amplificationquarterly
asset_deliveryasset_deliveryruntime-platform3600600003600asset scraping, hotlinking bursts, and bandwidth exhaustion against game delivery surfacesquarterly
auth_challengeauth_challengeplatform-auth206000020credential stuffing, OTP guessing, MFA enrollment abuse, OAuth churn, and desktop-code probingmonthly
authenticated_mutationauthenticated_mutationsecurity-kernel60060000600authenticated write amplification, accidental retry storms, and tenant-local resource mutation floodsquarterly
authenticated_readauthenticated_readsecurity-kernel1800600001800authenticated scraping, inventory enumeration, and runaway pollingquarterly
guest_admissionguest_admissionplatform-auth126000012guest account farming, play-session admission floods, and human-challenge bypass attemptsmonthly
immutable_static_assetimmutable_static_assetweb-platform120006000012000origin bandwidth and file-read exhaustion from one address replaying content-hashed bundle chunks past the edge cachequarterly
provider_callbackprovider_callbackintegrations12060000120signed webhook replay, provider callback flooding, and bogus provider event deliveryquarterly
public_readpublic_readsecurity-kernel3600600003600anonymous scraping, cache-bypass polling, and public catalog enumerationquarterly
readauthenticated_readsecurity-kernel1800600001800legacy read-policy alias drift causing reads to bypass the authenticated_read budgetquarterly
security_admin_readsecurity_admin_readsecurity-kernel30060000300admin inventory scraping, incident-console polling storms, and credential metadata enumerationmonthly
security_admin_writesecurity_admin_writesecurity-kernel606000060superadmin neutralization abuse, compromised admin session write bursts, and destructive-operation retry stormsmonthly
security_mutationsecurity_mutationsecurity-kernel12060000120tenant credential churn, API-key creation floods, capability-token abuse, and security setting mutation stormsmonthly
static_health_localstatic_health_localplatform-runtime3600600003600health/static route polling floods and local development endpoint abusequarterly

Category detail

anonymous_write

  • Canonical category: anonymous_write
  • Owner: security-kernel
  • Limit: 20 requests per 60000 ms window (20 per minute)
  • Keying: route method/path + request identity IP hash + resolved tenant/resource key
  • Abuse model: unauthenticated write spam, sign-up funnel abuse, and anonymous mutation amplification
  • Alert threshold: page when sustained deny rate exceeds 10 percent for 5 minutes or when a single route exceeds 500 denies in 10 minutes
  • Review cadence: quarterly

asset_delivery

  • Canonical category: asset_delivery
  • Owner: runtime-platform
  • Limit: 3600 requests per 60000 ms window (3600 per minute)
  • Keying: route method/path + player/browser/credential/IP identity + deployment/game asset resource key
  • Abuse model: asset scraping, hotlinking bursts, and bandwidth exhaustion against game delivery surfaces
  • Alert threshold: page when asset delivery denies exceed 2 percent for 10 minutes on a game or deployment
  • Review cadence: quarterly

auth_challenge

  • Canonical category: auth_challenge
  • Owner: platform-auth
  • Limit: 20 requests per 60000 ms window (20 per minute)
  • Keying: route method/path + account/credential/IP identity + auth resource key
  • Abuse model: credential stuffing, OTP guessing, MFA enrollment abuse, OAuth churn, and desktop-code probing
  • Alert threshold: page on burst denies for a principal or IP hash, or when challenge failures exceed baseline by 3x for 5 minutes
  • Review cadence: monthly

authenticated_mutation

  • Canonical category: authenticated_mutation
  • Owner: security-kernel
  • Limit: 600 requests per 60000 ms window (600 per minute)
  • Keying: route method/path + principal/credential identity + resolved tenant/resource key
  • Abuse model: authenticated write amplification, accidental retry storms, and tenant-local resource mutation floods
  • Alert threshold: page when deny rate exceeds 5 percent for 10 minutes on a route or tenant
  • Review cadence: quarterly

authenticated_read

  • Canonical category: authenticated_read
  • Owner: security-kernel
  • Limit: 1800 requests per 60000 ms window (1800 per minute)
  • Keying: route method/path + principal/credential identity + resolved tenant/resource key
  • Abuse model: authenticated scraping, inventory enumeration, and runaway polling
  • Alert threshold: ticket when route denies exceed 5 percent for 15 minutes; page for platform-admin read routes
  • Review cadence: quarterly

guest_admission

  • Canonical category: guest_admission
  • Owner: platform-auth
  • Limit: 12 requests per 60000 ms window (12 per minute)
  • Keying: route method/path + request identity IP hash + guest admission resource key
  • Abuse model: guest account farming, play-session admission floods, and human-challenge bypass attempts
  • Alert threshold: page when guest admission denies exceed 20 percent for 5 minutes or challenge failures spike by 3x
  • Review cadence: monthly

immutable_static_asset

  • Canonical category: immutable_static_asset
  • Owner: web-platform
  • Limit: 12000 requests per 60000 ms window (12000 per minute)
  • Keying: route method/path + request identity IP hash (a browser's chunk load carries no credential, so the client address is the bucket)
  • Abuse model: origin bandwidth and file-read exhaustion from one address replaying content-hashed bundle chunks past the edge cache
  • Alert threshold: page when denies exceed 1 percent of chunk requests for 10 minutes, which means legitimate cold boots are being refused
  • Review cadence: quarterly

provider_callback

  • Canonical category: provider_callback
  • Owner: integrations
  • Limit: 120 requests per 60000 ms window (120 per minute)
  • Keying: route method/path + provider callback identity/IP + resolved provider delivery resource key
  • Abuse model: signed webhook replay, provider callback flooding, and bogus provider event delivery
  • Alert threshold: page on signature failure bursts or when callback denies exceed 10 percent for 5 minutes
  • Review cadence: quarterly

public_read

  • Canonical category: public_read
  • Owner: security-kernel
  • Limit: 3600 requests per 60000 ms window (3600 per minute)
  • Keying: route method/path + request identity IP hash + public resource key
  • Abuse model: anonymous scraping, cache-bypass polling, and public catalog enumeration
  • Alert threshold: ticket when route denies exceed 5 percent for 15 minutes; page for sustained CDN bypass
  • Review cadence: quarterly

read

  • Canonical category: authenticated_read
  • Owner: security-kernel
  • Limit: 1800 requests per 60000 ms window (1800 per minute)
  • Keying: legacy alias for authenticated_read: route method/path + principal/credential identity + resolved tenant/resource key
  • Abuse model: legacy read-policy alias drift causing reads to bypass the authenticated_read budget
  • Alert threshold: ticket on any new route using read until it is migrated or explicitly justified
  • Review cadence: quarterly

security_admin_read

  • Canonical category: security_admin_read
  • Owner: security-kernel
  • Limit: 300 requests per 60000 ms window (300 per minute)
  • Keying: route method/path + platform admin principal identity + resolved security resource key
  • Abuse model: admin inventory scraping, incident-console polling storms, and credential metadata enumeration
  • Alert threshold: page when denies occur for PlatformOwner/PlatformSupport or exceed 2 percent for 5 minutes
  • Review cadence: monthly

security_admin_write

  • Canonical category: security_admin_write
  • Owner: security-kernel
  • Limit: 60 requests per 60000 ms window (60 per minute)
  • Keying: route method/path + platform admin principal identity + resolved target security resource key
  • Abuse model: superadmin neutralization abuse, compromised admin session write bursts, and destructive-operation retry storms
  • Alert threshold: page on any deny burst, any unexpected source geography, or more than 5 destructive commands per minute
  • Review cadence: monthly

security_mutation

  • Canonical category: security_mutation
  • Owner: security-kernel
  • Limit: 120 requests per 60000 ms window (120 per minute)
  • Keying: route method/path + organization/workspace principal or machine credential + resolved credential/security resource key
  • Abuse model: tenant credential churn, API-key creation floods, capability-token abuse, and security setting mutation storms
  • Alert threshold: page when denies exceed 5 percent for 5 minutes or credential mutations spike by 3x
  • Review cadence: monthly

static_health_local

  • Canonical category: static_health_local
  • Owner: platform-runtime
  • Limit: 3600 requests per 60000 ms window (3600 per minute)
  • Keying: route method/path + request identity IP hash + static/local resource key
  • Abuse model: health/static route polling floods and local development endpoint abuse
  • Alert threshold: ticket when static/local denies exceed 10 percent for 15 minutes outside synthetic checks
  • Review cadence: quarterly
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